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Elizabeth Shilton Lennon*

Collective Bargaining In The
Public Sector: Bargaining
Rights For Civil Servants In
Nova Scotia*

I. Introduction
A fundamental premise of Canadian labour relations legislation is
that all workers have a right to freedom of association, freedom to
require their employers to bargain collectively with their chosen
bargaining agent, and freedom to strike to persuade their employers
to agree to terms and conditions of employment. Yet in all
jurisdictions,' governments have denied or limited these rights with
respect to their own employees. This discrimination reflects a
deep-seated conviction among legislators and among many
members of the public that government employees pose unique
problems requiring special treatment in matters of labour relations.
In this paper I propose to examine both the legislative framework
within which this "special" treatment is meted out in Nova Scotia,
and the practical accomodations the parties to the public
employment relationship have made in order to live within that
framework. After discussing some of the more serious problems
that have arisen under this regime, I will examine critically the
theoretical basis for denying to public employees the collective
bargaining rights granted to their counterparts in the private sector
to see whether it furnishes adequate justification for withstanding
the pressures for change.
II. Legislative Framework Governing Public Employees
What is a public employee? Functionally defined, a public
employee is one who performs a public service function and whose
wages are paid out of a fund the ultimate source of which is taxation
or other government source of revenue. This functional definition
*M.A., LL.B. This paper was prepared for the course in Trade Union Law at
Dalhousie Law School.

I. In Saskatchewan civil servants bargain under The Trade Union Act, 1972,
S.S.1972, c.137, and have virtually all the rights that private sector employees

have. But even in that province there are limitations on what aspects of the
employment relationship can be negotiated: see The Public Service Act, R.S.S.
1965, c.9, s.58.
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might embrace: (1) employees of government departments, (2)
employees of government agencies, (3) employees of governmentfunded agencies run by non-profit, public service organizations, (4)
employees of municipalities, and (5) employees of Crown
corporations. But this functional definition bears little relationship
to the legal definitions that determine collective bargaining rights in
this province. Employees in the last three of these categories, for
example, are considered private sector employees, since irrespective of what they do or where the money comes from to pay them,
their employer is a legal entity other than the Crown or a Crown
agency.
For purposes of this paper I will be focusing primarily on
employees of the Crown and of Crown agencies. 2 Even within this
narrow compass public sector bargaining in this province is
characterized by legal and logical confusion. Employees fall into a
bewildering variety of legal categories and under a variety of
statutes. I will attempt to survey briefly the various categories, but
any survey is necessarily incomplete since the system is capable of
creating an infinite number of anomalies.
The Trade Union Act 3 provides that
3(l). Subject to subsection (2) this Act applies to all matters
within the legislative jurisdiction of the Province except
that it does not apply to Her Majesty in the right of the
Province or to the employees of Her Majesty.
(2)
This Act applies to any board, commission or similar
body that is an agency of Her Majesty in the right of the
Province and to the employees of the board, commission
or other body, other than those appointed by the Civil
Service Commission or the Governor in Council.
"Employees of Her Majesty" basically comprise employees of
government departments; they fall outside the Trade Union Act no
matter what the source of their appointment. But for employees of
Crown agencies the issue is more complicated. If they are appointed
by the Civil Service Commission or the Governor in Council, by
implication the Trade Union Act does not apply to them. But if they
are not appointed by either of those two bodies, the Trade Union
Act does apply.
2. Teachers' bargaining rights are excluded from the scope of this paper because
they are governed by a special statute, the Teachers' Collective Bargaining Act,
S.N.S. 1974, c.32
3. S.N.S. 1972, c.19
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It should be noted that s.3(2) speaks of "any board, commission
or similar body that is an agency of Her Majesty

. .

.", but makes

no reference to boards and commissions that are not agencies. This
language creates an anomaly that was revealed in a recent
application to the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board for a cease
and desist order. The Trade Union Act provides that
47(2). No police constable or officer, and no employee within
the terms of subsection (2) of Section 3 of this Act shall
strike or participate in a strike until a period of thirty days
has elapsed from the expiry of any time during which a
strike is prohibited under Section 45.
The bargaining unit at the Halifax Infirmary represented by the
Nurses' Staff Association went on strike before the thirty-day period
referred to in s.47(2) had elapsed, and the employer applied for a
cease and desist order, arguing that the Infirmary was a Crown
agency and therefore fell within s.3(2). The Board's finding was
that
• . . [t]he evidence of the relationship between the Government
of the Province of Nova Scotia and the Halifax Infirmary and in
particular An Act to Incorporate the Halifax Infirmary c. 105,
S.N.S. 1960 and the amendment thereto c. 18, S.N.S. 1973, has,
led the Board to conclude that the Halifax Infirmary is not an
agency of Her Majesty in right of the Province. Accordingly
employees of the Halifax Infirmary are not employees within the
terms of Section 3(2) of the Trade Union Act4 and are not subject
to the constraints of Section 47(2) of the Act.
In light of this finding the Board refused to issue the cease and desist
order.
The corollary of this decision is that boards and commissions
which do not stand in a strict agency relationship to the Crown are
simply private employers for purposes of the Trade Union Act, and
their employees have no special limitations on their right to strike. It
seems very unlikely that the Legislature contemplated this result in
framing s.3(2). 5 The Halifax Infirmary is funded entirely by the
4. L.R.B. No. 2197, dated June 13, 1975
5. Compare the provisions of the three relevant acts. (1) Trade Union Act: "any
board, commission or similar body that is an agency . . ." (s.3(2)); (2) Civil
Service Act: "any Board, Commission or other agency of the Crown" (s.53); (3)
An Act to Incorporate the Nova Scotia Government Employees Association:
(s.2(e)). It is submitted that all these
"boards, agencies and Commissions .
forms of words are intended to refer to the same bodies, and that it was not the
intention that they be restricted to just those bodies that meet the technical
definition of Crown agency.
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province, and its Board of Directors is composed entirely of Cabinet
appointees. 6 Provinces which have drafted their legislation more
carefully have taken care to see that institutions with these
characteristics are governed by public employee collective
7
bargaining legislation .
An employee of either the Crown or a Crown agency who is
appointed by the Civil Service Commission is a "civil servant"; his
labour relations are governed by two provincial statutes, the Civil
Service Act, 8 and the Civil Service Joint Council Act. 9 The first of
these statutes defines "civil servant" and establishes the Civil
Service Commission and its powers. The provisions of the Joint
Council Act will be studied in detail in the body of the paper.
The Civil Service Act defines its jurisdiction as follows:
1(a).
"Civil Service" means the positions in the public service
of the Province to which appointments may be made by
the Civil Service Commission and such other positions as
may be designated as positions in the Civil Service by the
Governor in Council.
"Public service" is undefined. The Act goes on to state that
53.
Notwithstanding any other Act the Governor in Council
may order that this Act and the regulations, except with
respect to tenure of office, shall apply in whole or in part
to any employee or class of employees in the public
service and to the employees of any Board, Commission
or other Agency in the right of Nova Scotia.
56.
The Governor in Council may designate any position in
the public service of the Province as being a Civil Service
position and any person in the public service as being an
employee in the Civil Service ....
This discretion operates "notwithstanding any other Act", and this
clearly includes the Trade Union Act. The legislative scheme is
6. See An Act to Amend Chapter 105 of the Acts of 1960, An Act to Incorporate
the Halifax Infirmary, S.N.S. 1973, c. 18, s.2.
7. See for example The Public Service Employee Relations Act, 1977, Bill 41, the
new Alberta legislation, which defines "employer" as
(i) the Crown in right of Alberta, or
(ii) a corporation, commission, board, council or other body all or the majority
of whose members or directors
(a),are designated by an Act of the legislature, or
(b) can be appointed or designated either by the Lieutenant-Governor in
Council or by a Minister of the Crown in right of Alberta . . ..
8. R.S.N.S. 1967, c.34
9. R.S.N.S. 1967, c.35
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such that employees of Crown agencies bargaining under the Trade
Union Act today could find themselves transformed tomorrow by
Order in Council into civil servants excluded from the Trade Union
Act.1 0
There are a significant number of employees of the Crown and
Crown agencies who are appointed by Order in Council rather than
by the Civil Service Commission. These employees do not fall
within the purview of the Joint Council Act, which applies only to
civil servants, and they are, of course, entirely excluded from the
Trade Union Act. These employees thus have no statutory
bargaining rights at all.
The government has in the past used its discretion to transfer
employees in and out of the civil service to solve labour relations
problems on an ad hoc basis. For example, a bargaining unit of
employees of the Department of Highways was carved out of the
civil service by Order in Council and given bargaining rights similar
to those under the Trade Union Act; the government bargains their
terms and conditions of employment with CUPE under a voluntary
recognition agreement. 11
There are thus government employees with full bargaining rights
and a right to strike, those with full bargaining rights and a limited
right to strike, those with the limited bargaining rights provided
under the Joint Council Act, and those with no bargaining tights at
all. There are also employees whoe bargaining rights continue at the
whim of the Governor in Council. The basis for these distinctions
often has little or nothing to do with the logic of labour relations. To
the extent that the distinctions rest on the legal status of the
"employer" they are arbitrary for labour relations purposes and an,
invitation to employee unrest. This has certainly been the result in
Nova Scotia.
Civil Service and Civil Service Joint CouncilActs
A Civil Service Act has been on the statute books of Nova Scotia
since 1935,12 and with the exception of some expansion in the

11.

10. This can work the other way too; employees can be removed from the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and thus given bargaining rights under
the Trade Union Act. Currently CBRT & GW is certified for a bargaining unit of
employees in the dietary, household and laundry departments at the Victoria
General Hospital, even though the majority of employees there are civil servants.
11. Information from the Economics and Research Division, Nova Scotia
Department of Labour.
12. S.N.S. 1935, c.8
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powers of the Commission and the addition of a grievance
procedure in 1962,13 the present Act is substantially the same. An
analysis of this Act alone would suggest that civil servants have no
bargaining rights at all. Section 9 provides that
The Commission, with the approval of the Governor in Council,
may make regulations relating to employment in the Civil Service
respecting:
(a) terms and conditions of employment;
(b) eligibility and qualifications for appointment;
(c) nature and extent of examination;
(d) classification and reclassification of employees;
(e) transfer and promotion of employees;
(f) compensation and increases in compensation of employees;
(g) termination of employment and what constitutes resignation;
(h) holidays, vacation, sick leave, special leave, and other
absences;
(i) days and hours of work;
() hearing and determination of complaints and grievances;
(k) public service award;
(I) the keeping and making of records and reports relating to
employees;
(m) any other matter deemed necessary or advisable for the better
carrying out of the purposes and intent of this Act.
This virtually runs the gamut of terms usually negotiated in a
collective bargaining relationship. If it is not clear enough from
Section 9 alone that the power to determine terms and conditions of
employment rests unilaterally with the Civil Service Commission
and the Governor in Council, the Act goes on to specify particular
powers and duties of the Commission with respect to
16 suspensions, 17
classification, 14 compensation, 15 appointments,
8
exclusions, 1 and entertainment of grievances. 19
The Civil Service Act must, however, be read in conjunction with
13. S.N.S. 1962, c.3
14. Supra, note 8, ss. 13-16
15. Id., ss. 17-21
16. Id., ss.22-47

17. Id., ss.48-51
18. Id.,s.54
19. Id.. s.58
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the Joint Council Act, passed in 1967.20 This latter Act provides for
the establishment of a Joint Council consisting of three "public
servants" representing government and appointed by the Governor
in Council, three representatives of the "Nova Scotia Civil Service
Association", also appointed by the Governor in Council but on
recommendation of the Civil Service Association, and an impartial,
non-voting chairman likewise appointed by the Governor in
Council. 21 This Joint Council "shall consider and negotiate such
matters as are put on the agenda". 22 "Any matter concerning the
terms of employment of civil servants including, but not so as to
limit the generality of the foregoing, working conditions,
remuneration, leaves of absence and hours of work" may be put on
the agenda. 23 In fact such items must be placed on the agenda by the
chairman if a member of Joint Council requests it and follows the
proper procedures. 24 The Joint Council must meet at least four
times a year. 25 If it cannot reach an agreement on agenda items there
is provision in the Act for mediation, 26 and ultimately for
compulsory arbitration. 27 The decisions of either Joint Council or
the Arbitration Board are binding on the Association. More
surprisingly, they are also purportedly binding on the executive
branch of government: Sections 8 and 9 of the Act provide that
The Governor in Council, notwithstanding the provisions of the
Civil Service Act, is empowered to and subject to Section 9 shall
implement any decision of the Joint Council or the Arbitration
Board and the Civil Service Commission is empowered to and
subject to Section 9 shall implement such a decision in the same
manner as it implements a provision of the Civil Service Act or a
regulation made thereunder.
20. The Joint Council itself was first established by Order in Council in 1964: see
Vaison and Aucoin, "Evolving Staff Relations in the Nova Scotia Civil Service"
(1969), 12 Can. Pub. Ad. 572.
21. Supra, note 9, s.2(l)
22. Id.,s.4
23. Id., s.3(d)
24. In the case of NSGEA and Theriault v. The Queen, application for certiorari
dismissed, S.H.Nos. 13948A,13949, 13950, unreported, the government argued
that only "rights" matters could be placed on the agenda of Joint Council, and that
"interest" matters could not be dealt with there (p. 10). The Court disagreed with
this submission and found that there were no restrictions on matters that could be
brought before Joint Council as long as they were sponsored by a member and came
within the statutory definition of "terms of employment" (p. 15).
25. Supra, note 9, s. 3(b)
26. Id., s.6(l), (2)
27. Id., s. 6(3)
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and
The Governor in Council and the Civil Service Commission are
not bound to implement any decision of the Joint Council or the
Arbitration Board which would result in any department
exceeding its appropriation, provided that the Minister of Finance
and Economics will include in the estimates for the next ensuing
fiscal year an amount sufficient to implement the decision
retroactive to the date on which the decision was to be effective.
While undeniably an improvement over a mere right to petition
the Crown, formerly the only recourse against arbitrary treatment
open to a civil servant, this is scarcely a collective bargaining
statute. First, all members of the Council are appointed, technically
at least, by the Governor in Council, one of the parties of interest in
the negotiations. On the face of the statute these appointments may
be quite arbitrary, and there is no guarantee that the nominal
representatives of either side will have a mandate to negotiate.
Second, there is no identification of the "Nova Scotia Civil Service
Association" which has a right to be represented on Council, nor
any indication of what its relationship should be to the civil servants
on whose behalf it is presumed to speak. There is no requirement
that civil servants be members of the Association or have any input
whatsoever into deciding what positions the Association will take at
the Joint Council table. Third, the Joint Council Act co-exists with
the Civil Service Act, and although some of the provisions of the
former Act are specifically designated as operating "notwithstanding the provisions of the Civil Service Act" there are still clashes
between the arbitrary powers given to the Civil Service Commission
and the intended scope of negotiations under the Joint Council Act.
Fourth, no item can be placed on the table of Joint Council unless it
has first been processed through an employer-controlled "grievance" procedure. 28 Fifth, the Joint Council Act does not
contemplate collective agreements. And sixth, the Act makes no
provision for agreements reached by Joint Council or the Arbitration
Board to be binding on the employees themselves.
These gaps in the structure of the Act reveal a measure of
government control over the proceedings quite inconsistent with
collective bargaining as it is usually understood. They are further
compounded by a conceptual problem inherent in the whole
procedure: how can a union bind government, or more accurately,
how can government bind itself? It is a fundamental principle of
28. Id., s.3(d)
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Anglo-Canadian constitutional law that no legislature can prevent its
successors, or even itself, from changing the law. Certainly no
executive can bind the legislature to pass a budget, and significantly
Section 9 of the Joint Council Act speaks only of including in
estimates for succeeding years amounts sufficient to implement
decisions, since there can be no guarantee that the legislature will
actually adopt those estimates. This may pose no practical problem,
since refusal by the legislature to implement executive recommendations is almost unthinkable under the Cabinet system unless the
party in power is so divided that a crisis is imminent in any case.
But it is a contradiction in the system of which both parties are
acutely aware, and a Cabinet beleaguered by what it considers to be
unreasonable contract demands can use the threat of a legislative
refusal to implement as an additional bargaining weapon.
An analysis of the Joint Council Act and the uses to which it was
actually put during the first few years of its existence suggest that
the intention was to provide not a structure for collective bargaining
but a structure within which disputes over terms and conditions of
employment could be processed on a piecemeal basis in the form of
grievances. This conclusion is consistent with the frequency of
meetings required of Joint Council, and with the fact that the
chairman is prohibited from putting items on the agenda of Joint
Council for negotiation
• . . unless he is satisfied that the appropriate proceedings in
respect of the matter have been taken under Section 58 of the
61, 62, and 63 of the
Civil Service Act and Regulations
29
Regulations under the Act.
The provisions referred to outline an internal grievance procedure
whereby individual employees may refer individual problems to
their department heads or the Civil Service Commission. In other
words, the only problems that can be negotiated at Joint Council are
those that cannot be resolved on an individual basis between the
employer and individual employees. Whatever merits a system like
this may have for resolving problems in the administration of the
collective agreement, it is antithetical to the philosophy of collective
bargaining whereby the individual employee gives up his own right
to negotiate in favour of his bargaining agent.
But in spite of the fact that the Joint Council Act makes no
reference to collective agreements and fails to provide a structure
29. Id., s.3(d)
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hospitable to the negotiation of such agreements, collective
agreements have in fact been concluded under its aegis. Prior to
1973 Joint Council had been used simply as a forum for processing
grievances arising out of the workings of the Civil Service Act, and
for periodic revisions of salary and benefit scales. But in February
of that year a unit of technical employees signed a collective
agreement and since then all civil servants (with the exception of
negotiated managerial exclusions) have followed their lead.
As the bargaining relationship has developed over the years,
negotiations do not in fact take place in Joint Council. Negotiators
from both sides (not necessarily members of Joint Council and
certainly not in that capacity) meet and attempt to reach agreement.
The government is presently represented on Joint Council by the
Civil Service Commissioner, the Deputy Minister of Finance and
the Deputy Minister of Social Services. 30 In actual negotiations,
however, it is represented by its Chief Negotiator, currently George
Hall. He is technically an employee of the Civil Service
Commission but takes his instructions from Cabinet, and in
particular a Cabinet committee on labour relations, as regards
collective bargaining.
If the parties negotiating outside Joint Council are able to agree,
their agreement is then (hopefully) ratified by government and by
the Association membership, and then implemented by the
Governor in Council in the form of a regulation under Section 9 of
the Civil Service Act. 3 ' Each such "regulation" contains a
provision that in the case of conflict between it and any other
regulation under the Act, the collective agreement "regulation"
shall prevail.
If the negotiators are unable to agree, the dispute is then referred
to Joint Council. But in practical terms the sole function of Joint
Council in such a case is to be "unable to reach agreement" within
the meaning of Section 6(1) of the Joint Council Act so that the
compulsory arbitration mechanism can be triggered. There has
never yet been a resolution of a contract dispute at the Joint Council
32
level since these procedures were developed.
Joint Council has a role to play, albeit a passive one, in the
negotiation of the collective agreement, as a conduit to binding
arbitration. Prior to the recent decision of Mr. Justice Hart of the
30. These are personal rather than ex officio appointments.
31. Interview with George Hall, Chief Government Negotiator.
32. Interview with George Hall
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Nova Scotia Supreme Court in Nova Scotia Government Employees
Association and Gerald Theriault v. The Queen 33 it was thought to
play the same role in the administration of the collective agreement.
The typical collective agreement contains the following Article:
The provisions for Arbitration contained in the Civil Service Joint
Council Act shall apply to the grievances resulting from this
Agreement. 34
This article was inserted on the understanding that the only way the
parties could, with any statutory authority, invoke binding
arbitration for any type of dispute was to go through Joint Council.
The procedure followed was that unresolved grievances were placed
on the agenda of Joint Council in the same manner as unresolved
contract disputes, and if they continued unresolved they were
referred to the Civil Service Arbitration Board.
Gerald Theriault's grievance, along with grievances of two other
employees on different issues, proceeded along this route and
eventually found themselves before the Arbitration Board. Among
other preliminary objections, counsel for the government took the
point that
.. . article 23.01 [identical to the typical provision quoted
above] of the collective agreement between the parties substituted
a right to arbitration thereunder for whatever right might
otherwise exist to proceed to arbitration through the Joint Council
for in ss.3,4,5 and 6 of the Civil
mediation procedure provided
35
Service Joint CouncilAct.
In other words, the argument was that not only was reference of
grievances to Joint Council not required; it was precluded by the
terms of the collective agreement. Astonishingly, the Board agreed
with this submission and dismissed the grievances.
The employees' association applied to the Supreme Court for an
order to quash this decision. The Court refused the order on
technical grounds, 3 6 but registered its disagreement with the
proposition that the procedure provided by the collective agreement
precludes the reference of a dispute to Joint Council. What is
interesting for our purposes, however, is the Court's view that
33. Supra, note 24
34. Quoted from the Agreement Between the Nova Scotia Government and the
Nova Scotia Government Employees Association - Group: Educational
Classificationand Pay Plan, Article 20.01.
35. Supra, note 24 at 15
36. The Arbitration award was upheld by an application of the "very question"
doctrine (see pp. 22 ff.).
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reference to Joint Council, while possible, is not necessary to
invoke binding arbitration, and not called for by the collective
agreement:
Article 23, in my opinion, incorporated the provisions for
arbitration contained in ss.7,8 and 9 of the Civil Service Joint
Council Act and were not intended
to refer to the matters covered
37
by ss. 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Act.
Grievances unresolved by the grievance procedure provided by the
collective agreement are to be referred directly to the Civil Service
Arbitration Board.
This interpretation is perhaps open to question. It could certainly
be argued that the statutory jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Arbitration Board is limited to deciding matters referred to it by
Joint Council, and that the government and the employees'
association have no more right to call on its services by agreement
than has any unrelated third party. But Hart J.'s interpretation has
the attraction of short-circuiting the cumbersome mechanism of
Joint Council, and the parties may be happy enough to adopt it.
Both parties affect to see this bargaining relationship, with its
precarious legal basis, as a creative response to an evolving
situation. In fact, at least on the government side, it can be viewed
more objectively as a tactic to pacify civil servants by giving them
the illusion of bargaining while denying them a stable, rational
bargaining structure in which their rights and obligations would be
clearly defined.
The truth is that even in 1967 when the Joint Council Act was
first passed, Joint Councils had become obsolete as a method of
resolving labour disputes in the civil service. Joint Councils are
based on the system of Whitely Councils which has been
functioning in the British Civil Service since 1919. In Canada, Joint
Councils serving a consultative and advisory function were
introduced in the federal civil service, and in Ontario, as early as
1944.38 In both these jurisdictions and in others as well it had
become clear by 1967 that the Joint Council system, even with the
additional features of power to make binding decisions and invoke
compulsory arbitration, had serious weaknesses that made it a poor
vehicle for the resolution of disputes in the labour relations climate
of the 1960s. In 1967 the Ontario government appointed a special
37. Supra, note 24 at 18
38. See Hodgetts and Dwivedi, ProvincialGovernments as Employers (Montreal:
McGill University Press, 1974) at 162-65.
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advisor to review thoroughly and if necessary to recommend an
overhaul of its entire system of bargaining in the civil service. 3 9 By
1967 the federal government had completed its overhaul of its
labour relations system, passing in that year the Public Service Staff
Relations Act. 40 That Act provides for collective bargaining with
bargaining agents chosen by the employees, and an optional right to
strike. The time for Joint Councils was past when Nova Scotia
implemented its legislation, and it is not surprising that the result
had been, in the words of Premier Gerald Regan himself, "an
unmitigated disaster" .41

IV. Nova Scotia Government Employees' Association
(i) Status
The Nova Scotia government is one party to this "unmitigated
disaster"; the other party is the Nova Scotia Government
Employees' Association (hereinafter "NSGEA"). 4 2 This Association sits on Joint Council with government and represents civil
servants in their negotiations. It is considered by both its members
and government to be a statutorily recognized union, with exclusive
jurisidiction to represent civil servants. Because of the sloppy
legislative framework within which collective bargaining for civil
servants takes place, however, its exclusive jurisdiction rests on
somewhat shaky legal underpinnings.
The Joint Council Act refers to the "Nova Scotia Civil Service
Association" as the body entitled to seats on Joint Council. This
was the predecessor of NSGEA; the Association changed its name
by constitutional amendment in 1971. It may be that a simple
change of name would not necessitate an amendment to the Joint
Council Act since the new NSGEA, having followed proper
consitutional procedures to effect the change of name, would
remain the same body in law. There is in Ontario authority for the
proposition that a simple change of name does not affect the
39. This was the Little Inquiry. Judge Little's report was published in 1969, and
the results are to be seen in The Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act,
1972, S.O. 1972, c.67 The Little Report is discussed in Arthurs, Collective
Bargainingby Public Employees in Canada:Five Models (Ann Arbor: Institute of
Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, 1971) at 104 ff.
40. R.S.C. 1970, c.P-35
41. Proceedings of the 1I th Nova Scotia Labour-ManagementStudy Conference,
1972, (Halifax: Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, 1972) at 22.
42. Incorporated by S.N.S. 1973, c. 136
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bargaining rights of a union named in a certification order. 4 3 But as
regards NSGEA more than a simple name change has taken place
since the enactment of the Joint Council Act. In 1973 NSGEA
incorporated and became unquestionably a different legal entity
from either the Nova Scotia Civil Service Association or the
unincorporated NSGEA. It is open to question, then, whether the
reference in the Joint Council Act to a new extinct Nova Scotia Civil
Service Association is sufficient to designate NSGEA, a body
corporate, a statutory partner to negotiations.
But assuming that the incorporated NSGEA is in fact the old
Nova Scotia Civil Service Association and therefore entitled to seats
on Joint Council, it does not follow that NSGEA is the only body
with whom government could negotiate concerning terms and
conditions of employment for civil servants. The Joint Council Act
does not say, as does the Teachers Collective Bargaining Act, for
example, that the named union is the only one with which the
employer can negotiate, or that all employees must be members of
the union. 44 Bearing in mind that effective negotiations take place
outside Joint Council and that collective agreements are implemented by government unilaterally as regulations under Section
9 of the Civil Service Act, there appears to be no statutory bar to the
government agreeing to go through this process with any trade
union or other organization, in effect granting voluntary
45
recognition.
Such an arrangement would not, of course, give much effective
bargaining power to employees represented by other unions. They
would not have access to the compulsory arbitration procedures laid
down in the Joint Council Act unless the government voluntarily
agreed to place disagreements on the agenda of Joint Council. It
would be extremely unlikely to do so, since by the provisions of the
Joint Council Act a decision of Joint Council or an arbitration
43. Ontario Hydro Employees Union and Hydro Electric Power Commission of

Ontario, 57 CLLC para 18,080. There may be different factors to consider when
the union is designated in a statute rather than a certification order.
44. Compare the ambiguous provisions of the Joint Council Act with the clarity of
the Teachers' Collective Bargaining Act: s. 1(1) "Every teacher as defined by this
Act shall be a member of the Nova Scotia Teachers' Union for the purposes of this
Act", and s.12(l) "The Union shall be the exclusive bargaining agent for the

teachers with the employer".
45. It has, of course, done just that by Order in Council with respect to individual
bargaining units, but the argument here is that Orders in Council removing units
from the civil service are unnecessary since it could bargain with other unions for
employees with the status of civil servants.
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board would bind the government, but not a union other than
NSGEA, and not the individual employees themselves. Satisfactory
terms could only be coerced by employee pressure tactics such as
work slowdowns, strikes or threats thereof, and since such action
would fall outside the purview of the Trade Union Act, all the
common law sanctions against it would be applicable.
For all practical purposes NSGEA enjoys a bargaining monopoly
since any other arrangement would depend on voluntary recognition
by government, and so far government has been unwilling to deal
with any union other than NSGEA as far as civil servants are
concerned. Nevertheless it is inaccurate to say that NSGEA has a
statutory monopoly on collective bargaining in the same sense as the
Teachers' Union dQes.
(ii) History and BargainingPhilosophy
In order to get a perspective on the effectiveness of NSGEA as a
representative of its constituents, it will be useful to examine briefly
its genesis, and. the historical roots of its approach to collective
bargaining. It was born as the Nova Scotia Civil Service
Association in 195746 in the manner of many company unions; the
government, beginning to feel threatened by moves of the legitimate
trade union movement into the public sector, took the initiative in
authorizing the formation of a Civil Service Association "the
constitution, rules and by-laws of which shall be subject to the
approval of the Governor in Council." 4 7 The civil servants who
availed themselves of this permission to organize were generally
those of high rank who shared the government's distaste for
legitimate trade unionism. The first president of the new
Association made clear his approach in his first newsletter to the
membership:
We are a civil servants' organization with ideals and purposes
neither wholly professional nor yet have they the characteristics
of a trade union . .

.

.The Government is friendly and I feel will

benefit greatly from association with our organization in its
techniques and
efforts to improve performance,
communication. 48
As it was born, so it continued. The partners in the developing
bargaining relationship were a government willing to co-opt the
46. Hodgetts, supra, note 38, at 70
47. Orderin Council
48. Newsletter, September 1958
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leadership in order to prevent civil servants from turning to the
legitimate trade union movement for help, and a managementoriented leadership willing to be co-opted. At every juncture change
occurred in the structures established only because of external
pressure, or the threat of such pressure from organized labour.
Prior to 1972, membership in the Association was open to all
civil servants below the rank of Deputy Minister. There were no
managerial exclusions whatsoever. Needless to say, the organization was largely controlled by people in managerial classifications
and totally failed to provide a forum within which rank and file civil
servants could express their views.
Since 1972, for reasons which are too complex to develop in this
paper but which have much to do with a general climate of labour
unrest in the country, NSGEA had moved closer to the trade union
movement and begun to identify more closely with its aims and
interests. In 1972, after the demise of the apolitical and ineffectual
49
Canadian Federation of Government Employees' Associations, it
voted to affiliate with the Canadian Labour Congress and made
overtures ip that direction although these ultimately proved
50
abortive.
NSGEA's changing perception of its relationship to organized
labour is also reflected in recent sporadic forays into organizing
outside the civil service proper. NSGEA is currently certified as
bargaining agent for a unit of technicians and related classifications
at the Halifax Infirmary. 5 ' This is the only non-civil service unit for
which it bargains directly, but certified associations at the Izaak
Walton Killam Hospital in Halifax and the Blanchard-Fraser
Memorial Hospital in Kentville are affiliated with NSGEA for
bargaining purposes. Likewise affiliated is the College of Cape
Breton Faculty Association which bargains under a voluntary
recognition agreement.
NSGEA itself attempted to gain certification for the unit now
represented by the IWK Technical Employees Association, the
technicians at the Killam Hospital. At the time it applied for
49. Hodgetts, supra, note 38, at 80
50. Interview with John Puchyr, Executive Secretary, NSGEA. The reasons are
somewhat obscure.
5 1. Query whether, in light of the LRB finding (supra, note 4) that the Infirmary is
not a Crown agency, NSGEA was entitled to be certified to represent these
employees at that time. The question is now academic since the NSGEA was
amended to give it power to organize in the private sector (S.N.S. 1976, Bill 38)
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certification its bargaining objects as outlined in its Act of
Incorporation were:
to bargain collectively with Her Majesty the Queen in the right of
Nova Scotia;
-

and -

to bargain collectively pursuant to the Trade Union Act with
boards, agencies and commissions of Her Majesty the
5 2 Queen in
the right of Nova Scotia from time to time appointed.
The Killam Hospital is a private hospital and not a board, agency or
commission of Her Majesty, and therefore NSGEA was not
authorized by its Act to bargain with it. The Labour Relations Board
dismissed the application for certification, following the lead of the
Ontario board 5 3 in refusing to certify a union for a bargaining unit
for whom bargaining would be ultra vires. 54
After this setback NSGEA was successful, over the opposition of
a formidable battery of labour groups, 55 in obtaining an amendment
to its Act expanding its powers, and it can now
• . . bargain collectively with employers of its members who are
employers for whom certification may be granted under the Trade
Union Act. 56
Although it could now organize in the private sector it has not
altered its affiliation arrangement with the Killam technicians or its
other affiliates. 5 7 It is presently doing no organizing outside the
civil service. The reason given for this is that NSGEA has found it
difficult to bargain under two different pieces of legislation and has
declared a moratorium on organizing outside the civil service until it
achieves its stated goal of persuading government to bring the civil
service under the Trade Union Act. 58 If this goal is as distant as
government officials suggest it is, organized labour has nothing to
fear from NSGEA.
52. Supra, note 42, s. 2(d), (e).
53. CSAO and Ottawa GeneralHospital, 1970 O.L.R.B.Rep.765.
54. This decision is discussed in Hansen et al. "Recent Developments in Labour
Law in Nova Scotia" (1976), 2 D.L.J. 791 at 800-80 1.
55. Including the Nova Scotia Federation of Labour, CUPE, CBRT&GW and the
New Democratic Party.
56. S.N.S. 1976, Bill 38, s. I(b)
57. In fact this constitutional amendment predates the certification order for the
Blanchard-Fraser employees, although the application for certification was made
prior to the amendment.
58. Interview with John Puchyr
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(iii) Structure
The present objects of NSGEA are:
(a) to promote the common interests of its members
(b) to foster high standards of service
(c) to maintain good relations with the employers of its members
(ca)to bargain collectively with employers of its members who
are employers for whom certification may be granted under
the Trade Union Act
(d) to bargain collectively with Her Majesty the Queen in the
right of Nova Scotia; and
(e) to bargain collectively pursuant to the Trade Union Act with
boards, agencies and commissions of Her Majesty the Queen
in the right of Nova Scotia from time to time appointed. 5 9
NSGEA has two organizational structures, one for collective
bargaining purposes and one for local and provincial administration
and policy-making. 6 0 As far as bargaining structure is concerned, it
is divided into eight bargaining components which serve the same
function as bargaining units under the Trade Union Act. These are:
(1)Professional (PR), (2) Education (ED), (3) Technical (TE), (4)
Services (SE), (5) Clerical (CE), (6) Hospital Services Nursing
(HSA), (7) Hospital Services Technical (HSB), and (8) Maintenance and Operating Services (MOS). Each component contains all
those employees working in that job category across the province.
Members of particular components come together to elect a
Component Representative Council. The chairman of each such
council is on the bargaining committee for that component along
with the president and the executive secretary of NSGEA. For
purposes of general administration and policy-making NSGEA is
divided into eighteen locals or branches on a geographic basis.
Membership in branches cuts across component boundaries. These
branches elect representatives to the Provincial Executive and to the
annual conventions.
(iv) BargainingRecord
The first full-scale collective agreement was negotiated in early
1973, and since early 1974 all components have worked under
collective agreements. But the terms of these agreements, both
monetary and non-monetary, show that the government is still the
59. S.N.S. 1973, c. 136, S.2'asam. by S.N.S. 1976, Bill 38, s. l(b)
60. See Nova Scotia Government Employees Association Constitution as amended
May 1976.
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dominant partner in this negotiating relationship. The rate of
increase for civil service salaries in the key years of 1969-74 was
less than the Nova Scotia average. 6 1 Furthermore, although
theoretically "any matter concerning the terms of employment of
civil servants "is on the table to be negotiated, NSGEA has made
very few inroads into "management's rights". A typical
'management's rights" clause reads:
It is the exclusive function of the employer to manage, which
function without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes
the right to determine employment, appointment, complement,
organization, work methods and procedures, kinds and location
of equipment, discipline and termination of employment,
assignment, classification, job evaluation system, merit system,
training and development, appraisal and the principles and
standards governing promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off and
reappointment and that
such matters will not be the subject of
62
collective bargaining.
The Association is excluded from such standard union functions as
participation in joint job evaluation and classification. The "merit
system" is particularily jealously guarded; the standard agreement
contains no seniority clause and the job posting clause is weak,
requiring the employer to post jobs but imposing no duty on him to
63
consider seniority in allocating jobs.
NSGEA's lack of bargaining success cannot be blamed simply on
its own weakness. This is probably an effect as much as a cause.
Such collective agreements as these are in fact an inevitable result of
structural weaknesses in the whole bargaining system, weaknesses
which give NSGEA no effective dispute settlement mechanism and
no recourse if the government chooses to bargain in bad faith.
The final dispute settlement mechanism provided by the Joint
Council Act is compulsory arbitration before the tripartite Civil
61. See Appendix. This table was prepared by Rollie Thompson, as part of his
study, infra, note 69.
62. Quoted from the Educational Component's collective agreement, supra, note
34, Article 6.01.
63. An idea of the vast scope of managements' rights under these collective
agreements can be gleaned from the Theriault case, supra, note 24. Theriault's
grievance was that he had been unjustly denied a promotion. The board found that
this was not a matter that could be considered by Joint Council, and was not

arbitrable. A second grievance heard at the same time was based on allocation of
leaves of absence with pay in an allegedly discriminatory manner. The board found
that this grievance too disclosed no breach of the collective agreement since
management was not obliged to apply any standards in determining how it would

allocate leaves of absence.
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Service Arbitration Board, which deals with problems which have
remained unresolved either through bargaining or through
mediation. 64 Its neutral chairman sits for a two-year term, whereas
the Association and government representatives are appointed on an
ad hoc basis. The problems inherent in attempting to resolve interest
disputes by the use of compulsory, binding arbitration have been the
subject of much comment. 65 It is a mechanism much beloved by
governments as an alternative to strikes by their own employees, but
in the private sector, both union and management are in general
agreement that such arbitration is inimical to the institution of free
collective bargaining.
John Crispo, in a recent discussion of interest arbitration, refers
to flaws "so many and various that it is difficult to know where to
begin." 6 6 He notes two in particular:
(1) the arbitrator or arbitration panel may become too normative
in framing awards, thereby losing the confidence of one or
both parties and undermining whatever acceptance there may
be of the arbitral process,
-

and

-

(2) there is a strong inducement on both sides to hold something
back from the anticipated trading-off process that almost
inevitably occurs in arbitration. Needless to say, this is
hardly conducive to effective
resolution of disputes through
67
collective bargaining.
This passage might have been written with the Nova Scotia Civil
Service experience as a model. With some continuity assured by the
fact that the Board chairman sits for a two-year term, arbitration
awards have fallen into a normative pattern. 68 Unfortunately, it is a
pattern that has caused the employees to distrust arbitration as a
route to fair settlement. For example, in the 1973 clerical
negotiations the government's final offer for stenographers was
$4,200 p.a., and NSGEA's final demand was $4,500 p.a.. The
arbitration award was $4,237 p.a..69 This is a typical result.
64. In practice mediation is rarely used.
65. See Brown, Interest Arbitration (Ottawa; Task Force on Labour Relations,
Study No. 18,
66. Crispo "Collective Bargaining in the Public Service" (1974), 16 Can. Pub.
Ad. I at 9.
67. Id., at 10
68. Joint Council Act, supra, note 9, s. 7(1) (a)
69. Information taken from Thompson "The Development of Collective
Bargaining in the Nova Scotia Civil Service, 1956 to 1974" (1975), unpublished
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Obviously if the government can count on the Board to make
awards not very far above its final offer, it will keep its final offer as
low as possible. In fact it has been guilty of the practice of
withholding its "true" final offer from the table until it has a
committment that NSGEA will recommend the offer for acceptance
and not force arbitration. 70 NSGEA, knowing from experience that
it has little to gain by arbitrating the penultimate offer, may
succumb to this "bargaining" tactic.
The system is clearly weighted in favour of the government since
the employees are deprived of any effectives means of voicing their
dissatisfaction or achieving reasonable settlements. But even though
the rules are written by and for management, the Nova Scotia
government is quite capable of changing those rules in the middle of
the game. Governments can, of course, changes the rules of
bargaining at any time; this is a constitutional fact of life for unions
bargaining with governments. But a government that erects a
bargaining structure and then threatens to demolish it if that
"bargaining" does not achieve the desired result in an individual
case is surely bargaining in bad faith. The Nova Scotia government
has been guilty of this on more than one occasion. The most
conspicuous example occurred in 1972. In that year the government
imposed a 5% guideline on civil service wage increases. Conscious
that such guidelines would not bind an arbitration board, Premier
Regan requested that the Association voluntarily comply with the
guidelines and not submit higher demands to arbitration. And as
further persuasion, he threatened to remove the right to arbitration if
71
the Association was so foolhardy as to refuse his "request".
To its great discredit the Association executive knuckled under.
This capitulation was consistent with its historic role as suppliant to
an omnipotent government, but hardly with the new role it was
attempting to assume as equal partner in a collective bargaining
relationship. The membership was not so submissive, and the
opposition of rank and file members to this executive decision was a
key factor in the palace revolution that brought about an almost
complete change in leadership in that year. But although the
Association won a victory over the guidelines it soon reverted to its
former conciliatory stance. This resulted in the estrangement of the
paper written for the course in Trade Union Law, Dalhousie Law School, note 10,
Table 6.
70. Id., at 135
71. Id. , at 64
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more militant bargaining components, notably the two Hospital
Services components.
(v) Breakdown in the System
Many civil servants have lost confidence in the compulsory
arbitration system to the point where they feel it should be avoided
at all costs, even to the point of substituting "illegal" forms of
pressure on government to obtain fair settlements. Cases in point are
the Hospital Services Nursing (HSA) component which resigned en
masse in 1973, and the Hospital Services Technical (HSB)
component which adopted the same tactic in 1975.
Civil servants in Nova Scotia are not expressly forbidden by their
legislation to strike. The only reference to strikes in the relevant
statutes is in SectionA-10 of the Joint Council Act:
The Association shall not sanction, encourage or support,
financially or otherwise, a strike by its members or any of them.
The Act itself provides no penalty for breach of this section,
72
although presumably it could be enforced by injunction.
An interesting question arises, however, as to the legal status of a
strike by civil servants that is not sanctioned, encouraged or
supported by the Association: a strike by a break-away component,
for example. Would such a strike be equally enjoinable? We must
make here a clear distinction between an injunction against
picketing and an injunction against the strike itself, or what would
be effectively a back-to-work order. Picketing in support of such a
strike would, of course, invite an injunction if accompanied by
unlawful activity of any kind, the usual pegs on which
anti-picketing injunctions are hung being the nominate torts and any
breach of statute.7 3 But as for the strike itself, it is difficult to see
how, in cases where the collective agreement has expired, an
injunction could issue. There would be no breach of a collective
agreement, and strictly speaking no breach of statute either, and
therefore the principles developed in the IBEW v. Winnipeg
Builders' Exchange case 74 would not be applicable.
72. At least to the extent of obtaining an injunction against picketing, and possibly
against the strike itself.
73. See Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort (Kingston: Industrial
Relations Centre, Queen's University, 196 7), passim.
74. (1968), 65 D.L.R. (2d)242 (S.C.C.). The case established that a strike itself
can be enjoined where it is in breach of a collective agreement and a labour
relations statute.
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Whether or not such a strike would be illegal, it would be
unprotected by the provisions of the Trade Union Act. Such a
withdrawal of services would almost certainly be a repudiation of
the employment contract entitling the employer to accept the
repudiation and refuse to reinstate the strikers. Their only protection
would be their own power to negotiate their reinstatement.
The question is at present academic, for when the members of
both HSA and HSB resigned en masse they were acting with the
sanction if not the encouragement of NSGEA and therefore laying
themselves open to an injunction if NSGEA actions violated Section
10. It was for this reason that they chose the route of mass
resignations rather than strike. But it is questionable whether mass
resignations of this nature are not in fact a strike. The collective
agreements themselves, which recite the anti-strike provisions of
Section 10, 7 5 contain a definition of strike imported almost
verbatim from the Trade Union Act:
"strike" means a cessation of work, or a refusal to work or
continue to work, by employees, in combination or in concert or
in accordance with a common understanding for the purpose of
compelling the Employer to agree to terms or conditions of
employment. . . .76
An industrial action like mass resignations fits squarely within this
definition, and although the collective agreement had ceased to be
in effect at the time of the mass resignations the Court could not fail
to look at it and at its model the Trade Union Act for guidance in
interpreting Section 10.
The government did not seek an injunction against HSA, but the
Nova Scotia courts had an opportunity to consider the legal status of
mass resignations during the walkout of HSB. At that time the
government made two applications for interim injunctions. Both
applications dealt only with picketing. The first was refused by Mr.
Justice Jones, mainly on the ground that the plaintiff had not made
out the kind of case necessary to justify an extraordinary remedy
like an interim injunction. He says:
The issue as to whether the defendant's conduct constitutes an
illegal strike and if so, whether all conduct resulting from such
75. See Education component agreement, slupra, note 34, Article 7.01, and
Agreement Between tie Nova Scotia Government and The Nova Scotia Government
Employees Association - Group: Health Services Classification and Pay Plan

HSB, Article 7.01, for example.
76. Quoted from HSB agreement, supra, note 75, Article 1.01(g)
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action should be enjoined, will have to be determined at trial. 77
He also says, however:
I am not satisfied in the evidence which has been presented
that the plaintiff has established that there is any illegal
before me
78
activity.
Although he makes no reference to Section 10 of the Joint Council
Act, this comment suggests that he found no breach of that section
since it is well settled that breach of statute can constitute sufficient
illegal activity to justify the issuance of an injunction against
79
picketing.
On the second application the injunction did issue. In this case,
however, there was clear evidence of inducing breach of contract
which is in itself sufficient to support the injunction. 80 In this
decision as well there is no reference to Section 10. As usually
happens in these cases there was no hearing on a permanent
injunction and therefore no full consideration of the question of
whether or not mass resignations constitute a strike. The issue must
be said to be still unresolved in this province.
Mass resignation as a dispute settlement mechanism has had
mixed results for NSGEA members. In the case of the HSA
component action, the dispute was resolved quickly and successfully from the point of view of the employees. However the similar
action taken two years later by the HSB component was not so
successful. There are a number of reasons why this was so, not the
least of which was that the government was determined to make an
example of the technicians and teach civil servants that they had
nothing to gain by "illegal" tactics. The nurses' settlement in 1973
had had a highly beneficial spin-off effect on collective agreements
negotiated by other components in that year. The government was
determined not to be so whip-sawed again. When the technicians
withdrew their services in February of 1975 the government dug its
heels in, quite openly prepared to let them freeze or starve before it
would bow to their demands.
The technicians were off work for seven weeks, and returned
only because the government took the position that "resigned"
technicians had no standing to vote on the contract that had been
77.
78.
79.
80.

R. v. Meek et al., oral decision of Jones J., S.H.No. 06031 at 6
Id., at 5
Gagnon v. FoundationMaritime (1961), 28 D.L.R. (2d) 174 (S.C.C.)
Oral decision, unreported

Collective Bargaining for Civil Servants 301

negotiated by NSGEA while they were off the job. 8 1 They voted
overwhelmingly to reject the contract, and finally submitted the
dispute to arbitration, where the usual "compromise" was reached.
The technicians' walkout, perhaps because it lasted so much
longer than the nurses' walkout, finally brought to public attention
serious internal differences that had been festering for some time
between the executive of NSGEA and the leadership of some of the
components. The technicians accused the executive of selling them
out by bowing to the government's refusal to negotiate with
resigned technicians; of gagging them by refusing to let them talk to
the press; of reneging on a promise to call for a province-wide
walkout of NSGEA members; and ultimately of entering into a
sweetheart deal with government which was so unacceptable that
82
even after seven weeks off thejob the component refused to ratify it.
These accusations reflect serious philosophical differences within
the Association, differences that may be irreconciliable. The HSB
component and to a lesser extent the HSA component are young,
militant units, no longer impressed by the twin mystiques of
"professionalism" and "civil service". Such groups would
inevitably clash with a leadership which, while it is more
trade-union oriented than its predecessors, is still in the old civil
service tradition, dazzled by the power of government.
Spokespeople for the HSB component have expressed their
determination either to "transform the NSGEA into a solid
organization" or "leave and seek affiliation with a trade union that
is prepared to work with them to improve the wages and working
conditions of public employees in Nova Scotia. ' 8 3 Under the
current legislative framework the latter is not really a viable
alternative; it remains to be seen whether or not they can accomplish
the former.
V. Why Not Full Collective BargainingRights?
Those negotiating on both sides of this relationship recognize the
futility of the situation and are anxious for change. But the solutions
they are seeking differ, as do their perceptions of the problem. The
public position of NSGEA is unequivocal: they want the Joint
Council Act repealed and civil servants placed under the Trade
81. Medical TechniciansTake on the Nbva Scotia Government (Halifax: Para-Med
Group, 1975) at 2.
82. Id. , passini

83. Id., at 22
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Union Act. 8 4 The negotiators for government, on the other hand,
are seeking only a rationalization of the current legislation to fit the
actual bargaining situation that has evolved, and a clarification of
rights and obligations on both sides.
So far government has been totally unwilling to consider the
NSGEA proposal. The major bone of contention is, of course, the
right to strike; government has rightly or wrongly concluded that
the people of Nova Scotia would not be receptive to legislative
changes that would legalize strikes in the public sector. Therefore,
although the issue will almost certainly rear its head again as it has
many times in the past, 85 it is unlikely that changes in the legislation
in the near future will do much more than tidy up some of the more
glaring incongruities.
Nova Scotia civil servants have more at stake than simply the
right to strike. If they were brought under the Trade Union Act they
would also gain the right to chose their own bargaining agent. They
would have the right to have their bargaining units determined by
the Labour Relations Board on "community of interest" lines rather
than by "negotiation", in this case a synonym for government
administrative convenience. They would have protection from
unfair labour practices. They could free themselves from the
albatross of Joint Council.
What would they stand to lose? NSGEA itself would lose its
status, already somewhat ambiguous, as exclusive bargaining agent
for civil servants. Its membership would be fair game for other trade
unions and almost certainly a significant proportion would defect.
But publicly at least NSGEA is quite prepared to make this sacrifice
of its own status in exchange for the advantages its members would
gain under the Trade Union Act. 86 More significant than loss of
exclusive status, at least in the eyes of the executive and some of the
weaker bargaining units, would be the loss of the right to demand
binding arbitration in the resolution of interest disputes. 87 Many
NSGEA members feel they would have little to gain by a right to
strike. As they perceive the situation, the public and government
could readily sustain a temporary loss of their services, and they
84. Interview with John Puchyr. There seems to be some doubt about whether the
NSGEA membership support this position.
85. Vaison and Aucoin, supra, note 20, conclude their article by noting that the
matter of full collective bargaining rights for civil servants was then under study by
the government (p.580). Their article was published in 1969.
86. Interview with John Puchyr
87. Interview with John Puchyr
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could not hope to force fair settlements in this kind of trial of
strength. It is ironic that these feelings are prevalent among civil
servants themselves when the government propaganda would have
it that all civil servants are so "essential" that the public welfare
demands continuity in their services.
The Nova Scotia government, in refusing to confront the question
of full or increased bargaining right for its employees, is swimming
against the stream in 1977. But is position has an historical basis in
certain theoretical and philosophical conceptions about the nature of
government and government service that die hard. Some of these
conceptions have been seen as obstacles to civil service unionism
per se; others are relevant only to the right to strike against the state.
Historically, a primary obstacle to collective bargaining in the
civil service was the concept of "sovereignty". Civil servants are
employed at the pleasure of the sovereign power, and how can the
sovereign be forced to bargain? Would not such bargaining be an
abrogation of the duty to govern? But "sovereignty" is an illusory
obstacle in a democratic state. Saul Frankel, a noted Canadian
commentator on labour relations, laid its ghost for collective
bargaining purposes with these oft-quoted words:
Just as the people may decide the rights and privileges of public
employees, they may also decide those of private citizens, private
corporations and other associations. The people as sovereign may
consider themselves unsuable, or they may allow themselves to
be sued. They may permit themselves to be bound by contracts
with private firms, or they may decide not only to ignore the
contract but to confiscate the physical and financial resources of
the firm. They may hold their civil servants in virtual bondage recruit them by conscription and maintain them in monastic
isolation; or they may grant them the right of association, provide
channels for mutual consultation, and even, if they will, accept as
binding the recommendations of a tribunal which owes its
existence to thesovereign' s caprice. One can pursue the argument to
its logical conclusion, but it becomes a reductio ad absurdum
in relation to experience. The fact is that the concept of
sovereignty can be defined so narrowly or so broadly that almost
any kind of practical adjustment is possible. 88
The government as sovereign may refuse to bargain with its
employees, but is may also choose to bargain, and the extent to
which it chooses to limit its unilateral powers by granting
88. Frankel, Staff Relations in the Civil Service: Tie Canadian Experience
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 1962) at 13-14.
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bargaining rights is a question of policy and not of legal or political
theory.
A second argument frequently raised against the concept of free
collective bargaining in the public sector is the argument that since
the wage fund comes from taxes and other government revenues
rather than from profits, collective bargaining is simply an
inappropriate instrument for arriving at a just determination of wage
levels in the public sector. This argument has been launched from
almost every point on the ideological spectrum. The "anti-labour"
formulation of the argument is that in the normal bargaining
situation rapacious workers limit their wage demands only by what
they believe to be their employer's ability to pay. Since the
government's ability to pay is limited only by its ability to tax,
workers will make "unrealistic" demands. Governments, particularily with the strike weapon held to their throats, will be forced to
surrender, 8 9 thus hopelessly distorting the labour market and putting
out of business many of the same taxpayers whose tax dollars
provided the money to fuel these extortionate demands. The
"pro-labour" formulation of the argument posits a diametric
reversal of the relative power positions of the two parties to the
employment relationship. In this scenario, the government is seen
as consistently backed by tight-fisted taxpayers who lend
unanimous support to hard-line positions, back-to-work legislation
and other totalitarian measures designed to crush troublesome civil
servants. Labour cannot win this kind of contest and must look to
other, more "objective" means of reaching wage settlements. 90
The fact that the same argument can be spun out of such different
premises makes its soundness suspect. The single shared premise is
that collective bargaining is a tool for solving "economic"
disputes, whereas labour disputes in the public sector are
"political"
disputes. 91 But surely this distinction between
economic and political disputes is a false one. Admittedly the costs
that must be counted in an unresolved public sector dispute are not
always the same as those that determine the resolution of a private
89. See, for example, Somerville inThe National, Vol. 2, No.7, at 4
90. This kind of argument was frequently met by CUPE organizers in their recent
abortive attempt to organize the non-academic staff at Dalhousie University.
Dalhousie employees do not, of course, work directly for the government but they
know where their wages come from.
91. See Proceedings, supra, note 41 at 23, comments by Premier Regan; and
Summers" Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective" (1974), 83 Yale
L.J. l156at 1156.
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sector dispute. Certainly civil servants do not have to worry about
the government pulling up stakes and moving to Mexico if the cost
of labour gets too high in Nova Scotia. Nor does the government
have to worry about its competitors enticing away customers if it is
forced to suspend operations temporarily. But there are costs of
disagreement on both sides that exert these same kinds of pressures.
The public welfare and safety is a factor that both sides have to
consider since each must attempt to attract public opinion to his side
of the dispute. And just as in the private sector, a disagreement that
results in a work stoppage means that the employee loses wages and
the employer services. Any resolution will depend on who loses
most in any given strike. In the public sector as in the private, the
balance may fall on either side depending on the facts of the
particular situation.
A third argument is one frequently heard from government
spokespeople and senior civil servants, 92 although it has not
attracted a great deal of public sympathy: that collective bargaining
is incompatible with maintenance of the traditional civil service
"merit principle". The basic fear is that the trade union principle of
promotion from within on the basis of seniority will undermine the
tradition of maintaining quality and eliminating political patronage
by awarding jobs on the basis of public, competitive examinations.
Stated badly, the clash is a real one, but when examined in light of
the practicalities of the situation it largely disappears. First of all, to
put the merit system on the table for bargaining is not to abandon it.
It is a rare union that has the strength or inclination to negotiate
seniority as the sole criterion for promotion, and this almost never
happens where jobs require different skills, knowledge and
experience. Furthermore, the government has already modified the
strict merit principle to recognize entrenched rights in those already
employed. Section 24 of the Civil Service Act provides that
Vacancies shall be filled by promotion or transfer insofar as it is
consistent with the best interests of the Civil Service.
This is just good managment practice; obviously civil servants will
perform better if they believe they have some kind of job security
and chance for advancement.
A fourth argument focuses specifically on the right to strike in the
92. Interview with George Hall. Even those provinces whose attitude to public
employee collective bargaining is most progressive are careful to frame their
legislation so that the merit principle is non-negotiable.
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public sector. The argument is basically that services provided by
government are ipsofacto essential to the public welfare. Since they
are essential, it is intolerable that the public should be deprived of
them simply because there is a labour dispute between the
government and its employees. This argument, particularily as
formulated by American commentators, is often couched in terms
that can only be described as demagogic. One writer says: "To the
extent that any community permits public employees to strike,
whatever the rationale and whatever the group, that community is
taking the first step to anarchy. "' 93 Another speaks of the public
sector strike as "a weapon with which to bludgeon the entire
community into submission." 9 4 Closer to home, a former president
of the Canadian Bar Association says ". . . the general citizenry is
held to ransom because the service or activity that has been
95
immobilized constitutes a vital segment of the national life."
But there is in fact no solid data to substantiate these dire
prognostications. Harry Arthurs, in discussing the more general
topic of strikes in essential industries, concludes:
The experience, as far as a random survey shows, has been the
same in the various essential industry disputes over the past 20
years. While there has been inconvenience, there has seldom
been danger. As to economic losses, these have no doubt
occurred; both parties and non-belligerents have suffered. But
how much the loss is off-set by pre- and post-strike economic
gains is almost impossible to assess. The only thing that can be
said with certainty
is that the estimates of loss, always exceed the
96
actual losses.
Arthurs surveyed hospital strikes, public utility strikes and strikes in
war industries, among others, in arriving at these conclusions.
In this province it is difficult to believe that the "essential
services" argument is being put forward in good faith. Because of
the conceptual and legal chaos governing the bargaining relationships of public employees most of the workers performing services
traditionally regarded as essential are not in fact civil servants. Fire
protection, garbage collection and police services are usually
municipal functions; employees performing these functions bargain
93. Dennis, ed., ArbitrationofInterest Disputes (Washington, 1974) at 25.
94. Marx, ed., Collective Bargainingfor Public Employees (New York: Wilson,

1969) at 100.
95. Somerville, supra, note 89
96. Arthurs, Labour Disputes in Essential Industries (Ottawa: Task Force on
Labour Relations Study No 8, 1968) at 32.
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under the Trade Union Act, although police officers come under the
strike postponement provisions of Section 47(2). "Public" utilities
are generally provided by municipalities, Crown corporations or
private enterprise, and are therefore legally part of the private
sector.
Hospital services present some of the greatest anomalies. All
hospitals under provincial jurisdiction provide similar services, and
all are wholly or largely funded by the Health Services and
Insurance Commission, a Crown agency that takes its instructions on
budgetary restraints from the Cabinet. Yet they do not all have the
same bargaining rights. Hospitals whose employees are appointed
by the Civil Service Commission, like those at the Victoria General,
bargain under the Joint Council Act and their employees have no
right to strike. Hospitals that are run by Crown-appointed boards
and agencies bargain under the Trade Union Act, with or without
the strike postponement provisions of Section 47(2). Hospitals that
are run by municipalities or charitable organizations bargain under
the Trade Union Act like any private employer.
The result is that most employees performing what are usually
regarded as essential services escape the strike ban, and the bulk of
government employees caught by it are those performing
administrative, clerical and maintenance jobs for government
departments. Can it be seriously argued that the public welfare
cannot withstand a strike by these people in a province that tolerates
police and hospital strikes?
In any case it is only realistic to recognize that however
intolerable the public may find the public sector strike, keeping such
strikes illegal will not prevent them. The Nova Scotia experience
itself has shown that when employees are sufficiently disaffected
they will strike whether it is legal or illegal. To quote a
distinguished Canadian commentator whose views on labour
relations in the public sector would probably be described as
'moderate":
To state the obvious, no method that can be devised to terminate
disputes guarantees peace and it is a fact that outright prohibition
of strikes by public servants has not prevented such strikes from
taking place. Indeed the view is held in some quarters that the
prohibition of strikes may lull management into a false sense of
security and, by egging labour on to defy the 97law, and thereby
prove its determination, actually causes strikes.
97. Finkelman, Enmployer-Emnployee Relations in the Public Service of Canada,
PartI(Ottawa, 1974) at 123.
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I would not argue that laws should be repealed simple because they
are not being obeyed. But surely the only justification for
discriminating against public employees by making it unlawful for
them to strike is that it is desirable toprevent such strikes. If in fact
the law does not prevent the strike, the law is merely punitive.
IV. Conclusion
None of these theoretical, philosophical or practical arguments has
sufficient force to justify the continued denial to civil servants of
bargaining rights which employees in the private sector have
enjoyed for years. In the Nova Scotia context these arguments lack
even the virtue of consistency, since most of them would apply with
equal force to large numbers of public sector employees who
presently bargain under the Trade Union Act without permanent
harm to the body politic. But the notion that civil servants are
somehow unique persists and continues to shape public policy. The
crux of policy-making in public employment labour relations is
always the issue of dispute resolution: should civil servants have the
right to strike?
Canadian jurisdictions have come up with a variety of answers to
this question. In Saskatchewan and British Columbia, civil servants
have the same right to strike as other employees. 98 In Newfoundland there is also a right to strike, subject to an exception in favour
of "essential" employees and emergency situations. 99 In the
federal civil service employees have a choice of method of dispute
resolution; each bargaining unit can opt for either binding
arbitration or conciliation/strike. 10 0 New Brunswick civil servants
have a similar choice, but in addition their legislation prohibits
picketing. '0 ' Quebec legislation prohibits strikes by peace officers,
but allows other civil servants to strike as long as "essential"
services are provided for. ' 0 2 In Ontario the recently passed Crown
Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 1972103 unequivocally
prohibits strikes in the civil service, opting instead for binding
98. The Trade Union Act, 1972, S.S. 1972, c. 137; Public Service Labour Relations
Act, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd Sess.), c. 144.
99. The Public Service (Collective Bargaining), Act, 1973, S.Nfld. 1973, c. 123
100. The PublicService Staff RelationsAct, supra, note 40
101. Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.N.B. 1973, c.P-25
102. Civil Service Act, S.Q. 1965, c. 14
103. S.O. 1973, c.67
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arbitration. Alberta's new legislation 10 4 contains a similar prohibition. Prince Edward Island and Manitoba, like Nova Scotia, are still
encumbered with the Joint Council system, but their legislation is
silent on the right to strike. 10 5 It is arguable that silence gives
consent in this context, but this was almost certainly not the
legislative intent.
It is submitted that Saskatchewan and British Columbia have the
best answer. Binding arbitration of interest disputes is, for reasons
already discussed, an unacceptable solution. It might be acceptable
if the alternative dispute settlement mechanisms imposed costs too
great to be borne, but there is no evidence that this is the case. The
system in which employees have a choice of dispute settlement
mechanisms has great superficial attractions; it creates the illusion
10 6
of providing the best of both worlds. But in both jurisdictions
that have adopted it, there are strong disincentives to choosing the
strike route. Certain employees in each bargaining unit that has
chosen the strike route are designated as "essential", and these
employees must work even if their fellow employees strike. This
greatly weakens any strike; in certain kinds of units the majority of
employees may find themselves designated "essential". 10 7 Because of this damper on free choice, and because of the feeling
among civil servants already discussed in the Nova Scotia context
that strikes would damage them more than the employer because of
the nature of the services they perform, binding arbitration has been
the choice of the overwhelming majority of units, at least in the
federal jurisdicition. 10 8 The result is that in these "choice"
jurisdictions as well as in those where binding arbitration is the sole
method of dispute resolution real collective bargaining is subverted.
In conclusion it is submitted that for all purposes which ought to
be considered in making policy decisions on collective bargaining
rights, there are no relevant differences between private and public
sector employees. Civil servants in Nova Scotia belong under the
Trade Union Act. Full collective bargaining rights for them are long
overdue.
104. The Public Service Einployee RelationsAct, supra, note 6. The controversial

Bill received Royal Assent on May 18, 1977.
105. Civil Service Act R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c.C-9; The Civil Service Act, R.S.M.
1970, c. 110.
106. Canada and New Brunswick.
107. "Designation" seriously impaired the effectiveness of the 1975 nurses' strike
at the Camp Hill Hospital, a federal hospital in Halifax.
108. See Arthurs, Collective Bargainingby Public Employees in Canada, supra,
note 39 at 39
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APPENDIX
PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN EARNINGS
N.S.G.E.A. AND PRIVATE SECTOR, 1969-74

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1969-74
Avg. Annual Rate 3

N.S.G.E.A.
1
ALL COMPONENTS

AVG.WEEKLY
EARNINGS 2
NOVA SCOTIA

7.8%
9.2
6.5
6.4
8.7
8.6

7.2%
10.3
8.3
9.2
9.1
11.9

56.4%
7.78%

70.5%
9.3%

1. Weighted average of all components. Mid-term lump-sum payments have been
split between the two contract years.
2. Nova Scotia Industrial composite for all workers in establishments employing
20 or more, excluding primary sector employment, e.g. agriculture and fishing and
non-commercial services, e.g. public administration, education and health
services.
3. Compound annual average.
SOURCE: Research Division, Civil Service Commission and S.C. 72-002.

